

For my opinion the best set of notes on Stone's live read. (KTD)

21-10-1988  
Lubyska Oct 21  
6044

POLICY PARADOX AND POLITICAL REASON by Deborah A. Stone.

Introduction: D. Stone offers five examples of potential paradoxes. 1. Baby M in relation to a policy question on everybody's mind regarding whether or not the courts should recognize and enforce surrogate motherhood contracts. The question of paramount importance was whether a surrogate motherhood contract is a contract for the sale of a baby or for a socially useful service. The second example was the savings reported in 1985 by the U.S. Navy of 2.5 billion in ship building costs over the previous three years. Paradox was that the Navy had been managing its shipbuilding programs expertly and efficiently over the past three years or it could be taken as evidence of fat in the Navy budget. If Navy officials publicized their savings, would Congress reward them for good performance, or cut back their budget. The third - the fifties mass transit proposal as a solution to urban congestion: the sixties "environmental protection" was the word of the day and mass transit advocates tried to sell subways and buses as a way to reduce automobile pollution and in 1972, with the OPEC oil embargo, attention was given to the energy crisis and mass transit was sold as an energy saving alternative. The fourth example was related to school integration and the fifth example was Reagan's opposition to both the house and the senate over the 1987 Highway Bill permitting 65 miles per hour speed limit and nearly 88 billion for a variety of state highway mass transit projects.

Stone argues that the "Rationality project" misses the point of politics. Instead, we must understand analysis in and out of politics as "strategically-crafted argument", designed to create paradoxes and resolve them in a particular direction. The project of making policy rational rests on three pillars: 1) A model of reasoning, 2) a model of society and 3) a model of policy making.

The model of reasoning employs a rational decision making process. (Identifying objectives, alternatives, predicting and evaluating consequences, selecting the best alternative) Instead, Stone says political reasoning is reasoning by metaphor and analogy. Political reasoning is metaphor-making: it is strategic for portrayal for policies sake.

The "model of society" underlying the contemporary rationality project is the market. The market model and the rational decision making model are thus very closely related. In this regard, society is viewed as a collection of autonomists, rational decision makers who have no community life. Their interactions consist of trading with one another to maximize their individual well being. In place of the model of society as a market, Stone suggests constructing a model of society as a political community. She claims that the market model of society envisions societal welfare as the aggregate of individuals' situations. The market model therefore gives us no way to talk about how people fight over visions of the public interest or the nature of the community.

The "model of policy" in the rationality project is a production model. It is created by an orderly set of sequences such as placing an issue

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on an agenda, defining it, moving through legislative and executive branches, solutions are proposed and analyzed while being legitimized, selected and refined; a solution is implemented by the executive agencies and constantly challenged and revised by interested actors. (such as the judicial branch) Instead, Stone believes ideas are at the center of all political conflict. Policy making is a constant struggle over the criteria for classification, the boundaries of categories and the definition of ideals that guide the way people behave.

## CHAPTER I

The Market and the Polis: Polis is the Greek word for City-State. A market can be defined as a social system in which individuals pursue their own welfare by exchanging things with others whenever trades are mutually beneficial. Participants in the market are in competition with each other for scarce resources; each person tries to acquire things at the least possible cost, and to convert raw materials to more valuable things that can be sold at the highest possible price. In the market model, individuals act only to maximize their own self interest. Unlike the market, which starts with individuals and assumes no goals, preferences, or intentions other than those held by individuals, a model of the "Polis" must assume both collective will and collective effort. In the Polis, there is a public interest. The concept of public interest is ~~to the market~~ what self-interest is to the market. In a market, an empty box of public interest is filled as an after thought with the side effects of other activities. In the Polis, people fill the box intentionally with forethought planning and conscious effort. The Polis is characterized by a special problem, out to combine self-interest and public interest (how to have both private benefits and collective benefits). Situations for self interest and public interest work "against each other are known as "Commons problems." Commons problems are also called collective action problems because it is difficult to motivate people to undertake private costs or forego private benefits for the collective good. The major dilemma of policy in the Polis is how to get people to give primacy to these broader consequences in their private calculus of choices.

A gap between self interest and public interest is bridged in the Polis by forces which include: influence, cooperation and loyalty. Our ideas and choices are formed through education and persuasion. Actions, no less than ideas, are influenced by others. (band wagon effects, panics, mobs, fads) Influence sometimes spills over into coercion. It is important to state an influence in all its degrees of strength as one of the central elements in politics. In the Polis, cooperation is every bit as important as competition. This is true for two reasons. First, politics involves making allies and organizing cooperation in order to compete with opponents. Second, cooperation is essential to power. It is often a more effective form of subordination than coercion. Cooperation, when it occurs, is a deviation from the well functioning market and words to describe it are usually pejorative-collusion, oligarchy, price fixing, insider

trading. In the Polis, cooperation is the norm. The words to describe it are more positive-coalition, alliance, union, party, support.

Loyalty: in the market, people are buyers and sellers. In politics they are enemies and friends. In the Polis, history counts for a lot, in the market, it counts for nothing. Thus, influence, cooperation and loyalty are powerful forces and the result is that groups and organizations, rather than individuals, are the building blocks of the Polis. Groups are important in three ways.

- 1) People belong to institutions and organizations even when they are not members.
- 2) Policy making is not only about solving public problems, but about how groups are formed, split and reformed to achieve public purposes.
- 3) Groups are important because decisions of the Polis are collective.

*Reactive*  
Information: in the ideal market, information is perfect, when you get it accurate. In the Polis, information is interpretive, incomplete and strategically withheld. Interpretations are more powerful than facts. Because politics is driven by how people interpret information, much political activity is an effort to control interpretations.

Information in the Polis is different from information in the market model, both because it depends so much on interpretation and because it is itself the object of strategic manipulation. In the Polis, information is never complete, you never know all the possible means for achieving a goal or all the possible effects of an action.

Especially since all actions have side effects and unanticipated consequences.

*Control*  
Passion: like passion, political resources are often enlarged or enhanced through use. Channels of influence and political connections, for example grow by being used. The more people work together to help each other, the more committed they become to each other and to their common goal. Examples of the law of passion include 1) the whole is greater than the sum of its parts; 2) that things can mean more than one thing at once. Power: is a phenomenon of communities. Its purpose is also to subordinate individual self difference to other interests. It operates through influence, cooperation and loyalty. It is based on the control of information. And finally, it is a resource that obeys the laws of passion rather than the laws of matter.

In summary, the Polis is described as the following: 1. It is a community. 2. It has a public interest, if only as an idea about which people fight. 3. Most of its policy problems are common problems. 4. Influence is pervasive and the boundary between influence and coercion is always contested 5. Cooperation is as important as competition. 6. Loyalty is the norm. 7. Groups and organizations are the building blocks. 8. Information is interpreted, incomplete and strategic. 9. It is governed by the laws of passions as well as the laws of matter. 10. Power, derivative of all the above elements, coordinates individual intentions and actions into collective purposes and results.

In the market model, change is driven by exchange, which in turn motivated by the individual quest to improve one's own welfare. In

the Polis, change occurs through the interaction of mutually defining ideas and alliances. Ideas about politics shape political alliances, and strategic considerations of building and maintaining alliances in turn shape the ideas people espouse and seek to implement. Ideas are the very stuff of politics.

## Part II - Goals: Equity, Efficiency, Security and Liberty

Equity is defined as "treating likes alike." Efficiency is "getting the most output for a given input." Security is "satisfaction of minimum human needs." Liberty is the ability to "do as you wish as long as you do not harm others." In a paradoxical way, the concepts unite people at the same time as they divide. Goals such as equity, liberty, efficiency and security are often invoked as justification for policy, a criteria for evaluating public programs, and, are often called values.

### CHAPTER II

#### Equity

The Dimension of Equality: the most famous definition of political science say it is the study of "who gets what, when and how".

Distributions - are at the heart of public policy controversies.

It is important to keep in mind from the outset that equity is the goal for all sides in a distributive conflict; the conflict comes over how the sides envision the distribution of whatever is the issue. (Chocolate cake distribution) The paradox in distributive problems: equality may in fact mean any equality equal treatment may require unequal treatment; and the same distribution may be seen as equal or unequal, depending on one's point of view. In any distribution, there are three important dimensions: the recipients (who gets something?); the item (what is being distributed?); and the process (how is the distribution to be decided upon and carried out?). See Table on page 33 regarding concepts of equality.

Challenge one, two and three are based on a definition - redefinition of recipients. Who should count as a member of the class of recipients? Who is to count as a citizen of the United States?

Challenge two is a claim for "distribution based on rank". The prevailing ideology in most societies that rank-based differentiation of rewards is justified. Military organizations and universities, factories and corporations, government itself-all pay their employees according to rank. This conception of equity based on relevant internal subdivisions is sometimes called horizontal and vertical equity. Horizontal equity meaning equal treatment for people in the same rank and vertical equity meaning unequal treatment of people in different ranks. The *débâte* about comparable work as a mode of determining wages and salaries centers on rank based distribution.

Challenge three is a claim for a group based differentiation. Quotas are a means of reserving a certain portion of an item to be distributed for members of a group. Group based and rank based distributions differ in that the former follow major social cleavages in society - divisions such as ethnicity, race, gender, or...

a society into two or three large blocks. Example, big city machines controlled by a single ethnic group give preference to members of their group in awarding contracts and distributing government jobs. Ticket balancing by political parties is a form of group based distribution.

Challenges four and five are based on the definition of the item to be distributed. Challenge four redefines the boundaries of the item. Expanding the definitional boundaries of the item to be distributed is always a redistributed strategy, because it calls for using the more narrow defined item. To compensate for inequalities in a larger sphere. (in the case of the cake, it could be lunch or dinner) Challenge five redefines the item in terms of its value to the individual.

The last three challenges focus on the process of distribution. They are calls for competition, lotteries and elections. The process dimension of distribution is important in the Polis because so many things of value are indivisible. Process is important because in the Polis, distributions do not happen by magic. They are carried out by real people taking real actions, not by invisible hands. One major class of challenges to the definition of equality is based on the notion of inequitable process. Instead of arguing about who the recipients are or what is being distributed, one can argue about whether the process of distribution is fair. Arguments for competition, lotteries, elections, bargaining and adjudication are all for this nature. In summary, every policy issue involves distribution of something. The task for the analyst is to sort out three questions: 1. Who are the recipients and what are the many ways of defining them? 2. What is being distributed and what are the many ways of defining it? 3. What are the social processes by which distribution is determined?

One major divide in the debate about equity is whether distributions should be judged by criteria of process or by criteria of recipients and items. Robert Nozick argues that a distribution is just if it came about by a voluntary and fair process. First, anything newly created (such as an invention) or not formerly held as property must be acquired fairly. And second, anything acquired by transfer - say by sale or gift - must be acquired fairly. Thus, in order to judge whether a distribution is just, one needs historical evidence - perhaps records of how acquisitions took place.

Nozick contrasts his process or historical concept of justice with what he calls the "end result" concept. In the "end result" concept, one looks at characteristics of recipients or owners and characteristics of items, and ask whether there is an appropriate match.

The other side of this divide is represented by John Rawls where he defines the relevant class of recipients as all citizens, and he defines the relevant items as "social primary goods". Social primary goods are things that are very important to people but are created,

shaped and affected by social structure and political institutions. Power, opportunity, wealth and liberties are among things Rawls includes. He distinguishes them from natural primary goods - things are important to people but which, while affected by society, are less directly under its control such as intelligence, strength, imagination, talent and good health.

A second major divide in the great debate is what kind of interference of liberty one finds acceptable as a price of distributive justice. On one side, liberty is freedom from constraint; on the other side, liberty is freedom to do what one wants to do. People who hold a process view of equity usually also see liberty as freedom to use and dispose of one's resources as one wishes, without interference. If you hold that view, you'll be very reluctant to sanction government redistribution. People who hold an end result view are usually more wont to see liberty as having enough faith in resources to choose out of desire rather than by necessity. If you hold that view, you will insist that government redistribute to ensure that everyone have the basic resources.

It is possible to arrange for specific liberties, such as freedom from hunger, speech, or to choose one's own doctor. The amount of redistribution necessary to provide the basic resources for liberty is very limited, and need not interfere substantially with anyone's right to dispose of his or hers resources. Equity, in this view does not require uniform shares but something for everyone but only adequate shares. This view of equity, is sometimes called fair shares, and holds that property rights can still retain their essential meaning - the right to use one's property as one wishes.

A third divide is whether one sees property as an individual creation or a collective creation. The fourth divide concerns human motivation. In one view, people are motivated to work, produce and create primarily by need. In the other view people have a natural drive to work, produce and create and they are inhibited by need. In one view, deprivation is the chief stimulus to work; in the other, internal drive protected by security is a chief stimulus.

Conservatism includes beliefs in distributive justice as fair acquisitions, liberty is freedom to dispose of one's property, property as an individual creation, and work is motivated by financial need. Liberalism includes beliefs in distributed justice as fair shares of basic resources, liberty as freedom from dire necessity, property as social creation, and productivity is stimulated by security.

### CHAPTER III

Efficiency: Getting the Most out of a Given Input or "Achieving An Objective for the Lowest Cost" are simple definitions of the goal of efficiency. It has come to mean the ratio between input and output, effort and result, expenditures and income, the cost in resulting benefit. Efficient choices are ones that result in the largest benefit for the least cost, or at least cost given benefit.

Because, as is so often true in the Polis, inputs are simultaneously outputs. Everyone supports the general idea of getting the most out of something. But to go beyond the vague slogans and apply the concepts to a concrete policy choice requires making assumptions about who and what counts as important.

There is a larger intellectual debate about the best mode of organizing human activity to achieve the greatest social welfare. The idea that voluntary exchanges are the best way to achieve efficiency is an essential tenet of the theory of markets. Once removed to an economy larger than a "two person island society", contracts and governments to enforce them become essential to a market. Another important function of government is to define rules of ownership. Ownership, in turn, is a right to use and trade something backed up by the state. Exchanges themselves have two important characteristics that serve as defining assumptions for the market model and allow it's adherence to claim that markets are the most efficient mode of social organization. First, the exchanges are voluntary. People engage in trades only if they want to and they trade only when they believe a trade will make them better off. Second, people make their voluntary exchanges on the basis of two kinds of information - objective information about the price and quality of all alternatives available for trade and subjective information about their own needs, desires and abilities. In the theory of markets, voluntary exchanges transform resources into something more valuable.

What goes on in a market is that both need and ability alter the universal values of things to individuals. They convert universal or market value to a higher individual value and thus produce efficiency. They make sure that resources and money are allocated to the people who get the most from them. Market models, even though they are concerned with distribution of things to people, use the "allocation" instead of "distribution". Allocation emphasizes the production side of the economy, rather than the consumption side.

Voluntary exchanges produce allocated efficiency: 1. People do not engage in exchanges unless someone expects to be made better off. 2. A re-exchange is a conversion of market values into higher subjective values. The re-exchange should lead to a situation in which the new holders get more value out of the resources than the old holders. 3. Exchanges make people better off as individuals, they necessarily make society as a whole better off.

Challenges from the market: In order for markets to yield efficiency, there must be numerous buyers and sellers. When this conditions fails, there is a monopoly if a seller can control price or monopsony if a buyer can control the price. In welfare economics, monopolies are often called natural or technical. A second condition for a well functioning market is that there must be full information about the available alternatives so that exchanges truly result in the best situation for everyone. A third condition is that the decisions and

actions of parties to an exchange must not affect the welfare of people who are not part of the exchange. A fourth condition is that the resources involved in exchanges must be used individually and used up if they are used at all. When this condition is not met, there is a type of market failure called collective goods. They are the type of commons problems described as social benefits entailing private sacrifices. National defense and light houses are the ubiquitous text book examples.

Challenges from the Polis: The problem of direct manipulation of preferences from inside the market poses another serious challenge to the argument that voluntary exchange leads to efficiency. Advertising, lawyers, engineers, doctors and other services and advice suppliers means that as an economy evolves away from agriculture and manufacturing toward a larger service sector, the degree of voluntarism in market exchanges may decrease. Another reason to question the possibility of purely voluntary exchanges is a vastly unequal distribution of income and wealth. Loyalty raises another dilemma for voluntarism. In the Polis, most exchanges are not merely one time events, but rather, part of a long term relationship. Long term relationships add a coercive element to exchanges in two ways. 1) Is that they generate expectations of continued exchanges and 2) relationships may also be coercive because they are often between parties with unequal power. Examples include exchanges between landlords and tenants insurance companies and policy holders. A second set of challenges from the Polis is that individuals make exchanges on the basis of full information about the objective alternatives and their subjective preferences. The challenge here is that it is impossible to have the type of information that is necessary for voluntary exchanges to result in efficiency.

A third set of challenges focuses on the equation of societal welfare with individual welfare. These challenges reject the idea that there is no meaningful concept of social welfare other than the aggregate of individual situation. In summary, markets are a way of organizing social activity just as other forms of governance are. They require a set of rules about who can sell, what can be sold, what constitutes a valid contract and how valid contracts can be enforced. They are also a mode of organizing social activity that gives more power to people who control money and property than to people who do not.

The equalities/efficiency trade off: equality and efficiency are often thought to be an 0-sum relationship: the more we have of one, the less we have of the other. There are three reasons why efficiency and equality are thought to be in a trade off. The first and most common is the motivation argument. It holds that inequality eliminates the differential rewards necessary to motivate people to be productive. Any move toward equalization of incomes - such as through welfare grant, progressive taxation - will reduce individual effort and personal savings. The second reason for the trade off is that to maintain equality, government must continuously interfere with individual choices about how to use resources. The third reason is the waste argument. To maintain equality requires a large



administrative machinery that uses up resources but is not itself productive. Okun dramatizes this argument with his metaphor of a leaky bucket: any redistributive policy is like carrying money from the rich to the poor in a leaky bucket. It is not clear that administrative machinery is wasteful because it employs people, integrates them in a social group and gives them dignity.

#### CHAPTER IV

Security - the quest for security - whether economic, physical, psychological or military - brings a sense of urgency to politics and is one of the enduring sources of passion in policy controversies. Need is probably the most fundamental political claim. The first and perhaps most important challenge to the idea of objectively definable needs is that material things have symbolic meanings which are more often important than their material value. Food is not just calories, but a sign of membership, social status and spiritual worth. Other examples include guns, in the context of physical security and gun control laws; water in the context of pollution debates; hazardous waste disposal and water rights disputes and air in the context of smoking.

Because of its symbolic dimension, need is relative as well as absolute. Absolute concepts type the definition of need to a fixed, usually a numerical point. An example is the poverty line, which defines need in terms of a fixed dollar amount of yearly income.

John Keynes asserted two distinct type of needs - those which are absolute in a sense that we feel them whatever the situation of our fellow human beings may be, and those which are relative only in that their satisfaction lists us above, makes us feel superior to, our fellows. Economists talk about prestige needs for status goods whose only function is to fit people higher in a social hierarchy.

Relative need is the perspective of people in society, in the present. Absolute need is the perspective of people outside society or people continually living in the past along side the present. Most people assess their needs by comparing themselves with neighbors where mainstream standards in the present. Relative need is not only a phenomenon of individuals. The same dynamic is in work in organizations, industry and firms as well. Occupations increasingly specialize and professionalize because of one attains the trappings of certification and licenseure, members of related occupations feel they need the same trappings to maintain their own status in economic security.

Our sense of national security depends entirely on comparison with the countries we perceive as enemies. And here Keynes is probably right: the need for weapons can only be satisfied by feeling superior to "them". Absolute need as a criterion may hold some appeal for its analytic precision and its stability over time and across communities. But as examples from social welfare and defense policy show, relative need is usually the more salient criterion in public

policy. Another dimension of need is "direct vs. instrumental". We need some things for the direct satisfaction they provide but for what else they enable us to have and do. Education is typically justified in this way. Import restrictions are necessary for the immediate survival of American producers; this is a direct need. Example, sensing the resistance of steel consumers to the permanently higher prices that protection implies, industry executives add an instrumental argument: import restrictions will give them time to modernize their plants and make other cost cutting exchanges. A fourth dimension of need has come to increasing prominence in the 20th century - protection from possible future needs as opposed to compensation for present or past lacks.

## SECOND TAPE - POLICY PARADOX AND POLITICAL REASON

*Future needs =  
fundamental fear*

Safety, or the prevention of future needs, has become a major preoccupation in public policy. It is arguably the driving force in food and drug regulation, environmental policy, nuclear power politics, consumer product regulation and occupational health. Future needs have a political potency far greater than actual needs, because fear of the unknown plays a bigger part. Finally, physical survival as a criterion of need is challenged by what we can call "communal" needs. Humans require community, solidarity, a sense of belonging; dignity, self respect, self esteem and honor; friendship and love. We need not only to have and receive, but we need to give and help.

These five dimensions of need are not meant to be a hierarchy, rather, they are ways of conceptualizing needs and lead to competing political claims about security. The argument here is that in the Polis, the boundary between needs and wants is unclear and unstable, and is constantly contested. Part of the human condition seems to be that people imagine the fulfillment of needs before they act, and are often disappointed by the actual experience having or achieving the things they sought. Ability to imagine some kind of fulfillment is probably essential to progress - it spurs us on - but it is also fatal to contentment. Relative need means that "one man's consumption becomes his neighbor's wish. Symbolic need means that goods become badges of prestige which can work only by being new, different and scarce. Advertising and promotion manipulate people's psychological needs. This analysis of the dimensions of need is helpful in explaining the dynamics of a policy conflict centered on the goal of security. It provides a framework to show how political actors can make plausible yet competing claims about security and also shows how any minimal and allegedly objective definition of need, such as sheer survival of an individual, can be expanded using the five dimensions: material vs. symbolic, absolute vs. relative, direct vs. instrumental, present vs. future, and physical vs. communal.

Need in the Polis: group politics, in society decides whether needs are real or legitimate. Much of politics is an effort to define needs collectively and this is another sense in which there is a public interest in the Polis. Even though many of the needs government attempts to satisfy are needs of society as a whole, the very process of determining needs through public agencies and institution assumes a public interest in knowing and satisfying needs. Those needs that a community recognizes as legitimate and tries to satisfy as a community might be termed "public needs." (remember that a public good is something that can be used jointly and is not used up as it is consumed) A lighthouse is a public good because it is in the nature of light signals to be visible to many users at one time and to persist even after being used. Communal provision for security may be the most important force holding communities together as well. When people in need receive aid, they are usually grateful to, and perhaps dependent on, the giver. Gratefulness and dependence create loyalty.

The security/efficiency tradeoff. Security and efficiency are often thought to be compatible. The first reason is the motivation argument. Another complication derives from the way productivity is measured. For example, the output current labor hour definition. In selecting a nursing home you

would look for a high staff to patient ratio. The very qualities that make human services more attractive to users make them less productive in our statistics. As services generate more security, meet more needs, they necessarily become less productive because of the way productivity is defined.

A second reason for a security efficiency trade off is the progress argument. It holds that progress for society as a whole cannot happen without individual losses, because there can be little investment in the areas without divestment from the old. New technologies can create better or cheaper goods, but only by rendering some workers skills obsolete and putting them out of work.

### Chapter V

Liberty - Liberty is the area of public policy where the tension between individual purpose and collective result is most pronounced. John Stuart Mills essay on liberty, "the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others." Mills way of thinking about liberty holds that there is a single criterion by which we can judge whether interference with individual actions is justified - namely, "harm to others". Second it is predicated on the possibility of a clear distinction between behavior that affects other people and behavior that does not. Third it sees liberty as the attribute of individuals, not social roles or groups for organizations. Finally, it defines liberty in a negative way - that is, as the "lack of interference" with individual action. To define liberty in this way requires us to think about what counts as "harm to others." Beyond bodily harm, we might consider material effects on others as a legitimate reason to interfere with individual liberty. Examples include causing someone else to suffer in loss of income or in slander cases, a loss of reputation for a business person and for that reason is an exception to the doctrine of freedom of speech.

Another type of harm involves amenity effects. Some activities cause aesthetic harms, such as placing advertising billboards on highways. "Emotional and psychological effects" are equally difficult to grasp yet important as types of harms. ~~Psychological harm spills over into the area "spiritual and moral harm."~~ Despite the strong tradition of separation of church and state in the United States, claims about spirit of harms continue to be heard in American politics. The school prayer issue can be understood as a conflict between those who believe that their children are spiritually harmed if denied the opportunity to pray in school and those who believe that their children may be psychologically harmed if pressured to choose between participating in prayer and remaining silent. Other issues discussed are the abortion issues and protecting severely handicapped people and infants.

Because the Polis is a community with some collective vision of a public interest, the liberty of individuals is also limited by obligation to the community. Example, most societies require members to honor contracts and promises, pay taxes to support government, give up land for public projects, educate children and aid the needy. In a sense, these obligations are forms of compelling people to bear individual costs for social benefits. There

are several kinds of harms that cannot be accounted for in a framework of individually calculated harms. One is "structural harms" - effects of the ability of the community to function as a community. When private schools are allowed to compete with the public, the ability of schools to integrate children of different social backgrounds suffers. Funding public education through a system of vouchers rather than through appropriations to public schools would no doubt diminish discussion of the quality of schools on the public agenda. 2. "Accumulative harms" some actions like walking across the grass, fishing in a pond or withdrawing ones money from a savings bank are not harmful when one person does them, but they are if everyone, or even a lot of people, do them. 3. "Harm to a group that results from harm to individuals" - in the Polis, people live and work in groups and the effects of injuries to individuals carry over into these groups. When an applicant for a job is rejected on the basis of race, the harms go beyond the person's immediate loss of job and the denial of pay, status, respect and work experience. His or her children are denied emotional and financial security and perhaps the resources and motivation to continue their education. Others in the minority community are deprived of a potential "friend in the business" a role model, a supervisor or co-worker of the same race, or a mentor.

The liberty/security trade-off: two dilemmas - first is the dilemma of independence. Security creates dependence. As Bismarck understood so well, whenever people depend on government for their essential needs, they feel constrained to obey and support their provider. Security seems to be necessary for liberty and yet undermines it. The second dilemma is the problem of paternalism: when, if ever, should government prevent people from acting voluntarily in a way that harms themselves? Should government curtail liberty in order to promote security? Examples include; should passengers be required to wear seat belts and should motorcyclists have to wear helmets? When should the goal of security be allowed to override the goal of individual liberty? According to John Stewart Mills, the answer is never. But just as characteristically, Mills felt compelled to make one exception to his rule. Society can legitimately prevent people from entering into contracts to enslave themselves, even though no one but the slave is harmed by slavery. He allowed this exception because by entering into slavery, a person gives up his liberty and protecting individual liberty is the very purpose of prohibiting paternalism in the first place.

The liberty/equity/equality tradeoff: Example - people have different talents, skills and attributes to secure the valued resources and opportunities in society. To maintain equality, government would have to take away resources and positions from some (the advantaged) and give them to others (the disadvantaged). This taking away of resources and positions interferes with the freedom of action of the advantaged. Such a conclusion can only be drawn from a negative concept of liberty, one that defines it as the absence of restraint. There is another tradition that sees liberty as the availability of meaningful choice and the capacity to exercise it. In this positive view, liberty is expanded whenever a persons's control over his or her life is increased. There are two aspects to control: first the range of issues or problems over which one can exercise control; the second, the resources, both material and non-material, that enable one to envision alternatives and carry out one's will.

~~Power, wealth and knowledge are thus pre requisites to liberty in a positive view, because they are sources of capacity to exercise choice. Liberty in this view is a matter of degree: those with more power, wealth and knowledge have more freedom than those with less. In the negative view, and contrast, liberty is often treated as an all or nothing concept. It is imagined as a space or territory in which the individual resides and around which there is a fence to prevent intrusions. Finally, the positive concept of liberty links individual and social freedom. Liberty in the negative sense is the absence of coercion by other human beings.~~

As leaders of the disabilities rights movement point out, physical handicaps are as much the product of billing design as of human anatomy physiology. The social mechanisms of "interferences" with individual liberty are far more complex than the image of individually caused harm implicit in negative liberty. The central issue for a positive view is then not what kind of harms should be prevented, but what constraints on individual freedom are within the realm of human agency.

### Part III

#### Problems

As noted in Part II, there are no fixed goals or fixed positions in the Polis. Since there are competing conceptions of abstract goals, people fight about which conception should govern policy. The ideal of equality can yield multiple distributions. Efficiency is a standard amenable to numerous conflicting interpretations. Security encompasses complex needs that change even as they are satisfied. Liberty conceived as "activity without harms to others" turns out be a very small sphere in modern society; and conceived as control over one's life and well being, it is a perennial quest. In the Polis, problem definition is never simply a matter of defining goals in measuring a distance from them. It is rather the "strategic representation" of situations. Problem definition is a matter of representation because there is no objective description in a situation; there can only be portrayals of people's experiences and interpretations. It is strategic because groups, individuals and agencies deliberately and consciously design portrayals so as to promote their favorite course of actions.

### Chapter 6

Symbols - Symbolic representations is the essence of problem definition in politics. A symbol is anything that stands for something else. It's meaning depends on how people interpret it, use it and respond to it. Any good symbolic device shapes our perceptions and suspends skepticism at least temporarily. They are means of influence and control even though it is often hard to tell with symbols exactly who is influencing whom. There are four aspects of symbolic representation which include narrative stories, metaphors, ambiguity and snychdoches.

Stories - policy problems usually have a narrative structure; that is, they are stories with a beginning, middle and an end, involving some change or transformation. Two broad story lines are prevalent in politics. One is a story of decline such as "in the beginning things were pretty good but

they got worse. In fact right now they are nearly intolerable. Something must be done." This story usually ends with a prediction of crisis. The second common type of narrative policy analysis is a story of control and helplessness. Example: the situation is bad. We have always believed the situation was out of our control and something we couldn't influence. Now, let me show you that in fact we can control things. Stories that tell us of less control are always threatening and one's that promise more are always heartening. A disease like cancer, previously thought to strike victims unpredictably, now turns out to be related to diet, smoking and chemicals. Stories that move us from the realm of fate to the realm of control are always helpful, and through their hope invoke our support.

Another variant also moves us from the realm of fate to the realm of control, but locates control in the very people who suffer the problem. These are stories of "blaming the victim". Example: the poor are poor because they do not "delay gratification" and do not invest in their own futures. What these stories of control have in common is their assertion that there is choice. Policy stories are tools of strategy. Policy makers often make problems (in the artistic sense) as a context for the actions they want to take.

Synecdoche - Synecdoche is a figure of speech in which a whole is represented by one of its parts: "10,000 feet moved down Pennsylvania Avenue toward the White House." It is common in politics that one part of a problem particularly catches the popular imagination, evokes a sense of horror and confines the policy response to that of the problem. Examples noted include policies about treating severely defective newborns symbolized by the Baby Doe and Baby Jane cases; the legislation protecting employment rights of handicapped as noted in only demonstrating those with "physical impairments" and those who use wheel chairs. Even a graphic symbol to denote handicapped accessibility of buildings and parking spaces as a wheelchair.

Metaphors: using a word that denotes one kind of object or idea to describe another - for example, Reagan blasted the press; industry is being strangled, we live on space ship earth. Metaphors are important devices for strategic representation of policy analysis. Example of diagnosing the problem as "fragmentation" and prescribing "coordination." Merely to describe something as fragmented is to call for integration as an improvement. Because policy metaphors imply prescription, they are a form of advocacy.

One common metaphor is to see social institutions as living organisms. communities are groups who are said to have a "life of their own" and organizations have "goals." Other examples include the political system as a machine with working parts and had to be kept "in order" and "in balance." The symbolic nature of this is a "check and balance system." Another set of policy metaphors is based on containers and the idea of a fixed space. (there might be spill overs, "mopping up operations", outbursts and explosions such as people seeking outlets for their frustrations.) Disease, especially the contagious variety, forms the basis for many policy metaphors. Cults, communism in fact any movement or set of ideas one wants to condemn, are said to "spread." Teenage pregnancy, unwed mothers and high school dropouts are declared "epidemics." The metaphor of war is ingrained

in policy language such as we wage "war on poverty", suffer the "invasion of privacy" and "war on cancer." Organisms, machines, containers, diseases and wars are some of the most frequent and overarching metaphors in policy. But in all policy discourse, names and labels are used to create associations that lend legitimacy and attract support to a course of action. Certain symbols, such as individualism, freedom, privacy, localism and states rights are calculated to restrict scope of conflict, while others, such as equality, justice and civil rights are calculated to expand it.

Ambiguity: the most important feature of all symbols is their ambiguity. A symbol can mean two or more things simultaneously: "equal opportunity in education" can mean giving everybody a tuition voucher or providing extra resources for those with special needs.

The ambiguity of symbols helps transform individuals strivings into collective decisions. Symbols allow coalitions where pure material interests would divide people. They enable leaders to assemble broad bases of support for particular policies. They facilitate negotiation. They permit policy makers to retreat to smaller, less visible arenas to get things done. They quell resistance to policies by reassuring at the same time as the actual policies deprive. In all these ways, politics obeys the laws of poetry rather than laws of matter: a program on policy or speech, unlike a physical object, can be two things at once. But if symbols are the invisible hand of politics, it is not because there is any overall force coordinating individuals, but because they enable us as individuals to "read ourselves into" social programs and collective actions.

## Chapter 7

Numbers: The most common way to define a policy problem is to measure it. Most policy discussions begin with a recitation of figures showing that a problem is big or growing, or both. The fundamental issues of any policy conflict are always contained in a question of how to count the problem. The unemployment rate is an example of this. Counting must begin with categorization, which in turn means deciding whether to include or exclude. It involves the establishment of boundaries in the form of rules or criteria that tell whether something belongs or not. Numbers are the opposite of symbols—they are not ambiguous. Something is either counted or it isn't. But ambiguity—the range of choices and what to measure or how to classify—always lies just beneath the surface of any counting scheme.

Numbers as metaphors: because counting requires judgement about inclusion and exclusion, counting schemes are always subject to two possible challenges. One kind asserts a real likeness where the measure finds a difference and insists of inclusion of something the measure excludes. For many policy purposes, we make fairly arbitrary classifications by setting a cut-off point on a numerical scale. Examples include welfare eligibility, LSAT, levels of alcohol, etc. The second kind of challenge asserts a real difference where a measure finds a likeness, and insists on exclusion of something the measure includes. The second type can be illustrated with the problem of counting hospital beds. (page 129)

Numbers as norms and symbols: the call for measurement or survey of something is to take the first step in promoting change. Not only does



measuring the problem create subtle pressure to do something about it, but some level of the measure usually becomes the norm. Examples include the WPA and full employment definitions. As norms, numbers are part of a story of helplessness and control. Most obviously, numbers are the premier language for stories of decline and decay. Figures are invoked to show that a problem is getting bigger and worse. The act of counting and publicizing a count convey hidden messages. First, to count something at all is to assert that the phenomenon is at least frequent enough to bother counting. Second, to count something is to assert that it is an identifiable entity with clear boundaries. To count something is, third to create a community. Any number is implicitly an assertion that the things counted in it share a common feature and it should be treated as a group. A fourth hidden story is that numbers offer the promise of conflict resolution through arithmetic. Numbers are a vehicle for devising, weighing and balancing because putting a number on something makes it susceptible to arithmetic manipulation. Finally, numbers are symbols of precision, accuracy and objectivity. They suggest mechanical selection, dictated by the nature of the objects, even though all counting involves judgement and discretion.

Making numbers in the Polis: when people know they are being measured, they try to imagine the results before hand. Measurement provokes people to "play the role" and to present themselves as they want to be seen. Changes of behavior in response to being observed and measured are often called "reactive effects". Reactivity derives from two essential features of the Polis: 1) influence and 2) interpretive nature of the information.

When a problem first gathers public attention, reformers begin to collect statistics and compare the present with the past. Many public problems are in fact things that have been tolerated for decades, if not centuries - alcoholism, child abuse, wife beating, environmental degradation, etc. Dramatic growth rates in these problems reflect a decline in social tolerance of the phenomenon more than an increase in the phenomenon itself.

If dissatisfaction induces counting, counting can also induce dissatisfaction and the desire for change. An example of this would be surveys of illiteracy and tests of students knowledge which almost always lead to curriculum reform.

Measurers lead the people they measure. Measurers have power over the fate of the measure, since measuring is done to help decide on policy actions. The census taker not only counts the heads, but also determines the apportionment and seats in the house of representatives. The health inspector makes bacteria counts but with them closes down restaurants and destroys reputations. Words are powerful in the presentation of numbers such as "dropped substantially, moved sluggishly, marginal, etc." Numbers in policy debates cannot be understood without examining how they are produced by people: what makes people decide to count something and then find instances of it; how the measurers and the measured are linked together; what incentives people have to make the numbers appear high or low; and what opportunities they have to behave strategically. People change the activities that are being measured. They try to influence the measurers. The exercise of counting makes them notice things more. Measurers change the way they count because their measures affect how they, not the measured, are treated. The things being counted become bargaining

chips in a strategic relationship between the measurers and the measured. The choice of measures is part of strategic problem definition, and the results of measures take on their political character <sup>only what</sup> the costume <sup>only with</sup> of interpretive language.

Chapter 8

Causes: Policy analysis is dominated by the notion that to solve a problem, one must find its root cause or causes; treating the symptoms is not enough. In politics, we looked for causes not only to understand how the world works but to assign "responsibility" for problems. To identify a cause in the Polis is to place burdens on one set of people instead of another. It is also to tell a story in which one set of people are oppressors and another are victims. In the Polis, causal stories are strategically crafted with symbols and numbers and then inserted by political actors who try to make their versions the basis of policy choices. Causal stories are essential political instruments for shaping alliances and for settling the distribution of benefits and costs.

There are two primary frame works for interpreting the world: the natural and the social. To the natural world we understand occurrences to be undirected, unguided, unanimated "purely physical" - the clash of a cold front and a warm front causes a storm. In the social world we understand events to be the result of will, usually human but perhaps animal. We usually think we have an adequate understanding of causation while we can identify the purposes for motives of a person or group and link those purposes to their actions. Coaxing, flattering, driving and threatening makes sense as efforts to change the course of events. Erving Goffman refers to "the blind effect of nature and intended effect of man" - the first seen as in infinitely extended chain of caused and causing effects and the second something that somehow begins with a mental decision.

*causal stories*

The distinction between action and consequences can be used to create a framework for describing the causal stories used in politics. (refer to page 149)

Intentional causes: where an action was willfully taken by human beings in order to bring about the consequences that actually happened. If the consequences are perceived as good, this domain is known as rational action. If perceived as bad, we have stories of oppressors and victims. Inadvertent causes - the unintended consequences of willed human action. Here, the consequences are predictable but still unforeseen. Problems such as poverty, malnutrition and disease are said to result when people do not understand the harmful consequences of their willful actions. Accidental causes - include natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, droughts and hurricanes. Mechanical causes - include things that have no will of their own but are designed, programmed or trained by humans to produce certain consequences. In mechanical causes, the exact nature of human guidance or control is then an issue. many policy problems (toxic hazard, etc.) require a more complex model of cause to offer any satisfying explanation. There are three broad types - 1) complex systems - hold that the social systems necessary to solve modern problems are inherently complex. Today's technological systems, such as chemical production, involve parts that serve multiple functions, juxtapositions, different environments, feedback loops,

*to PV and the*

etc. A second type of complex cause might be called "institutional." This model envisions a social problem as caused by a web of large, long standing organizations with ingrained patterns of behavior. A third type of complex cause might be called "historical". This model holds that social patterns tend to reproduce themselves.

Making causes in the Polis: there are many strategies for pushing responsibility onto someone else. For the side that believes it is a victim of harm, the strongest claim it can make is to accuse someone else of intentionally causing the problem. Mechanical causation is a somewhat stronger claim because it implies intended consequences. A common strategy in causal politics is to argue that the effects of an action were secretly the intended purpose of the actor.

The concept of risk has become a key strategic weapon for pushing a problem out of the realm of accident into the realm of purpose. Risk serves this function in two ways. One, when the harms at issue are bodily injury or death, the probable association of harmful outcomes with human actions is widely accepted as a demonstration of cause - and - effect relationships. ~~If the harms associated with an action or policy are predictable,~~ the business and regulatory decision is to pursue a course of action in the face of that knowledge appear as a calculated risk. Before the Pinto case, asbestos and agent orange litigation are examples. 2. A second way risk serves to push harms into the realm of purpose within the area of civil rights - "disproportionate impact" on a minority group.

The accused side: the side accused of causing a problem is best off if he can show the problem was accidentally caused. The second best is to show that the problem was caused by someone else. The third strategy for the side accused of causing the problem is to show inadvertence.

The political success of causal theories is also constrained by two powerful social institutions for determining cause and legitimating claims about harms: law and science.

Using causes in the Polis: first, they can either challenge or protect an existing social order. Second by identifying causal agents, they can assign responsibility to particular political actors so that someone will have to stop an activity, do it differently, compensate its victims or possibly face punishment. Third they can legitimize an empower particular actions as "fixers" of the problem and, fourth, they can create new political alliances among people who are shown to stand in the same victim relationship to the causal agent.

Even when there is a strong statistical and logical link between a substance and a problem - such as alcohol in car accidents, hand guns in homicide, tobacco in cancer deaths etc. - there is still a range of places to locate control and impose sanctions. Each of these problems has a virtually identical team of causation: substance - user - seller - manufacturer - raw materials and supplier.

In summary, causal theories, like other modes of problem definition, are efforts to control interpretations and images of difficulties. Political actors create causal stories to describe harms and difficulties to attribute

them to actions of other individuals and organizations, and thereby to invoke government power to stop the harm. Like other forms of symbolic representation, causal stories can be emotionally compelling; they are stories of innocence and guilt, victims and oppressors, suffering and evil.

THIRD TAPE (second tape is on computer in Special Services)

## Chapter 9

### Interests

Concept of Interests: There is much political wisdom in the old proverb, "the squeaky wheel gets the grease." The proverb is usually invoked to show that it pays to complain, but there is also another equally important meaning: just because a wheel doesn't squeak doesn't mean it has enough grease. Political scientists distinguish between objective and subjective interest. Objective interests are those effects that actually impinge on people, regardless of people's awareness of them; subjective interests are those things people believe affect them. When objective interests are correctly perceived and converted to subjected interests, liberals speak of political awareness and Marxists speak of "development of consciousness".

One approach holds that we can identify objective effects of policies and situations-that is, what happens to people is a consequence of certain actions or policies - and that objective interests are the actions or policies that will serve people best, given these effects. An approach that seeks to avoid the problem of imputing interests to others defines objective interests as what a person would want or prefer if he or she had experienced all the alternatives and were free to choose. This definition might be called rationality under freedom. The Marxist tradition in social science holds that people have interest as classes rather than as individuals, and that certain common situations - such as occupation, race, or religion - have an overwhelming impact on people's well being and life opportunities.

Representation is the process by which interests are defined and activated in politics. It has a dual quality: representatives give expression to an interest by portraying an issue, showing it how it affects people and persuading them that the portrait is accurate; and representatives speak for people in the sense of standing for them in articulating their wishes in policy debates.

Making interests in the Polis: the process by which effects and experiences are converted into organized efforts to bring about change is called "mobilization" in political science. All potential problems have an equal chance at stimulating political organization, but people ration their energy by paying attention to the things they care about most. One theory of mobilization has captured the imagination of the entire political spectrum. It sees the "free rider problem" as a major obstacle to interests mobilization. Individuals have little or no incentive to joint groups and work for a collective good, since they will receive that benefit if others work for it and are successful in attaining it. The logic of collective action theory takes that none but the smallest of most individually oriented groups will organize.

Mobilization in the Polis: First, people exist in the Polis not as

autonomous, isolated atoms but as subjects of influence by parents, friends, teachers, bosses etc. 2. Participation in collective efforts tends to follow the laws of passion rather than the laws of matter. 3. The third reason has to do with the importance of symbols and ambiguity. The logic of collective action theory is expressed as a collective goods problem. 4. The substance of an issue determines whether and how organizations get involved in promoting and expanding it. James Wilson devised a widely used game that relates political mobilization to the types of effects that policies produce, good and bad. He uses the terms "benefits" and "costs" to describe good and bad effects, and the terms "concentrated" "diffused" to capture the intensity or strength of policy effects. Effects are concentrated if they are spread over a small number of people such as a tax on a particular type of business, and diffuse if they are spread over a number of large people, such as a general sales tax. Note table on page 177.

How issues and interests define each other: the table on page 181 lists the characterizations of political contest. The underlying story in all these portrayals is that a small selfish concern may be able to dominate a larger more virtuous concern. Examples include collective vs. individualistic, diffused vs. concentrated broad vs. narrow, long term vs. short term, etc. In any political contest, both sides try to amass the most power, but it is always the weaker side who seeks to bring in outside help.

#### Chapter 10

Decisions: A rational decision model: 1) defines goals, 2) reviews alternative means for attaining them, 3) evaluates the consequences of taking each course of action and 4) chooses the alternative most likely to attain the goals. In all decision models, the decision in step 4 is made on the basis of a single criterion - "maximum total welfare." Sometimes process is more important than the decisions because we may value the way a decision is made more than its outcome. There are variations to the rational model briefly described as: cost benefit analysis - it consists in tallying up the negative and positive consequences of an action to see whether on balance the actual lead to a gain or loss. The decision is then made according to a single criterion or rule: take the action if its benefits outweigh its cost. The next, risk benefit analysis works similarly to cost benefit analysis in that you tally up the pluses and minuses except that here the minuses incorporate measures of the likelihood of negative effects as well as of their magnitude. For example, if a new drug has a 10% change of killing a hundred people, that expected cost would be estimated at 10 lives. Political actors are dedicated to showing that a favorite course of action benefits society as a whole and imposes costs on no one in particular. From this point of view, the maximum total welfare criterion of the rational model can be seen as a highly desirable costume with which people try to dress their own proposals. The construction of alternatives and selection of consequences contribute to the making of the final costume, the decision criterion. In the guise of numbers and the seeming logic

of "maximizing welfare", the criterion appears as an irrefutable and even innocent way of deciding. In fact, the decision was made long before the criterion was invoked. As a matter for our own strategy as audience or analyst, always be on the look out for Hobson's choices whenever you are presented with an either/or choice you should be tipped off to the trap. You can disengage it by imagining different alternatives other than those presented by giving new attributes to the ones presented.

#### Part IV

#### Solutions

#### Chapter 11 - Inducements

Our most common sense notion of how to bring about change rests on the proverbial carrot and stick. With incentives, you make it easier or more rewarding for people to do something you want them to do; with deterrents, they make it harder and more costly for them to do something we don't want them to do. One uses the promise of rewards the other the threat of penalties, but they both rely on getting other people to choose actions we would desire. The purpose of inducements is to bring individual notice into line with community goals. Inducements alter the consequences of individual action so that what is good for the community is also good for the individual. It is useful to think of inducement as a system with three parts: 1. The inducement giver, 2) the inducement receiver or target and 3) the inducement itself. Inducements work not through direct force, but by getting people to change their minds. In the simple model of inducements, the society penalizes an activity, people would do less and if rewards an activity, people will do it more In the Polis, things are not so simple. Inducements are usually designed by one set of people (e.g. policy analysts, legislators, etc.), applied by another (the givers), and received by yet a third (targets). There is never a direct correspondence between the inducement as proposed by the designer and supplied by the giver. The biggest problem is a lack of willingness to impose sanctions or hand out rewards on the part of officials charged with meeting them out. Negative sanctions are divisive and disruptive to relationships and therefore to the sense of community. Even positive incentive systems are sometimes resisted because people fear the divisive and competitive atmosphere they would generate. Insensitive pay schemes - performance based salary increases or bonuses - have often run afoul of employees. The incentive approach is said to have many of the virtues of the market. It lets individuals make their own decisions, thus enhancing freedom and voluntarism. Yet, it achieves desired goals at the lowest possible cost to society. Standards are said to dictate behavior, discourage individual initiative and innovation in achieving goals, leads way to ways of society resources. Whether they are called rewards or penalties: they are imposed on one set of people by another. Inducements in any form are somebody's conscious effort to change someone else's behavior, and they can be successful only to the extent that one side has the power to apply them to another.

## Chapter 12

## Rules

Policy making is usually concerned with official rules - rules consciously designed to accomplish social goals. Societies have many types of rules to coordinate behavior in addition to formal laws and regulations - social customs and traditions, informal norms of small groups and families, moral laws and principles, and the rules and by laws of private associations. Some kinds of official rules mandate behavior. They command people, organizations and governments to act in certain ways. Other rules confer powers, either on private citizens and organizations or on public officials and bodies.

How a rule works: rules derive their power from legitimacy, the quality of being perceived as good and right by those whose behavior they are meant to control. They generally have two parts. They prescribe "actions" to be taken in certain "situations" or "contexts." They can be formulated as "if---- then" statements. Rules depend on context because the way we regard actions - their value, their moral qualities, their acceptability - depends on context. Slitting open one's belly is medical therapy when done by a doctor, assault when done by hoodlum. Rules work by classifying situations and actions as like or unlike for purposes of action. In applying a rule, one asks whether the situation for action is "like" that defined in a rule: if so, the rule applies. A rule creates incentives for people to portray their behavior as falling within or outside it.

In search of good rules: the most important problem in the design of rules is attention between precision and flexibility. The argument for precise formal rules rests on three pillars. First precise rules are said to insure that "like cases will be treated alike". Second precise rules are said to insulate people from the whims, prejudices, moods or predilections of officials. Third, precise rules are thought to provide predictability

Precision has its disadvantages. Precise rules cannot be sensitive to some kinds of individual and contextual differences, so that inevitably, "different cases will be treated alike". Precise rules stifle creative response to new situations. The failings of precision are claimed as the virtues of vagueness. Vague rules, with very broad categories and lots of room for discretion, can be flexible and allow sensitivity to differences. They enable creative responses to new situations. Vague rules allow for incorporation of what Michael Polanyi calls "tacit knowledge" - the things people know but cannot put into words, much less formulate as rules. Vague rules, finally, also serve important symbolic functions. Just as precise rules symbolize fairness and predictability, vague rules allow for the expression of community ideals. In the Polis, the myths of perfectly precise, neutral and enforced rules are essential to the legitimacy of laws. Our reigning image of fairness remains the idea that "likes are treated precisely alike", however, little guidance the formula provides in practice.



## Chapter 13

## Facts

The two faces of persuasion: in political theory, persuasion has two faces, one revered and the other feared. On one side, persuasion evokes images of reasoned and informed decision, what we can call the rational ideal. The rational ideal has spawned numerous policy ideas based on rational persuasion and voluntary behavior change. We have embarked on educational campaigns to get people to stop littering and smoking; to use seat belts and drive safely; to conserve energy in joining car pools; food content labeling, cigarette warnings, etc. The rational ideal, in some, offers a vision of society where conflict is temporary and unnecessary, where force is replaced by discussion, and where individual actions are brought into harmony with the persuasive power of logic and evidence.

Persuasion's ugly face is captured in the words "propaganda" and "indoctrination". Indoctrination has two elements that distinguish it from the process of education or informing conceived in the rational ideal. The first it is intentionally manipulative, disguising the hidden motives of its perpetrator. Second, indoctrination robs people of their capacity to think independently. Indoctrination suggests images of big brother and thought control.

Making facts in the Polis: Most of our knowledge and ideas about the world come not from direct observation but through social knowledge. In the accumulation of presentation of observations and beliefs. Persuasion as a policy statement has often been viewed either as a neutral instrument of science in the market, or as a dangerous weapon totalitarian government. These ideal types obscure the nature of influence in the Polis. Shaping of information is an inevitable part of communication and an integral part of strategic behavior. The rational ideal is false in pretense that information is neutral or that people are primarily rational and independent creatures. But the preceptor model is equally false in its presumption that indoctrination occurs only when there is a single political authority dispensing propaganda through communications media and schools. Indoctrination, defined as the intentional manipulation of opinions and preferences and the destruction of prevention of independent judgment, occurs in liberal democracies. It takes place as much through the withholding of information as through the dispensing of it.

## Chapter 14

## Rights

Rights are another way of governing relationships and coordinating individual behavior to achieve collective purposes. Rights partake something of rules and sanctions, but as a political strategy rights are a more diffuse method of articulating standards and behavior in an ongoing system of conflict resolution. The discourse of rights has two broad traditions, positive and normative. In the positive tradition, a right is a claim backed by the power of the state. In the normative tradition, it is harder to know whether a right exists that there are several schools of thought about how we can define

Conclusion: Political Reason. Inspired by a vague sense that reason is clean and politics is dirty, Americans yearn to replace politics with rational decision making. Policy is potentially a sphere of rational analysis, objectivity, allegiance to truth and pursuit of the well being of society as a whole. Politics is the sphere of emotion and passion, irrationality, self interest, short sightedness and raw power.

Stone mentions that policy making is portrayed as a sequential process that sometimes gets out of order. An issue was put on the agenda and defined. It moves down the conveyor belt of political institutions, from legislative committees to chambers of the whole, where it is converted into a "policy alternative" or program. The program moves on to the bureaucracy and out into the field, where it is implemented and perhaps evaluated. Her central argument is that the categories of thought behind reasoned analysis are themselves constructed in political struggle and non-violent political conflict is conducted primarily through reasoned analysis. Reasoned analysis is necessarily political. It always involves choices to include some things and excludes others. And to view the world in a particular way when other visions are possible. Policy analysis is political argument and visa versa.

Metaphoric vs. calculating reason: The rational model of decision making is reasoning by calculation. It rests on estimating the consequences of actions, attaching values to the consequence and calculating to figure out which actions yield the best results. However, calculation cannot occur until we already have categories in place. The definition of categories determines how a count will come out. Categories are human mental constructs in a world that has only continua. They are intellectual boundaries we put on the world in order to help us live in an orderly way. That is the meaning of the phrase "social construction of reality" in the school of thought it denotes - not that there is no reality of part from social meanings, but that we can know reality only by categorizing it, naming it and giving it meaning. Policy is essentially about classification and differentiations, about how we do and should categorize in a world where categories are not given. The old saws about "treating likes alike" and "giving each person his due" tap into a powerful drive for order. Policy arguments are convincing to the extent that they give us a satisfying account of the rightness of treating cases alike or differently. Political reasoning, therefore, is primarily the result of sameness and difference. Policy argument takes the general form of claiming that something should be included in or excluded from the category. Numbers carry implicit categorizations of the things they measure. Causal stories divide events into those like accidents and those like willed or controlled actions, and within the realm of control they differentiate degrees of responsibility. Representations of interest divide political actors such as strong and weak forces and good and evil characters.

Reasoning by calculation, the reasoning of more or less becomes important and politics only once categories have been established.

Then we can ask, will policy A or B lead to the least harm? or, does library budget A or B give us more value for the money? We can not even ask such questions until we have established what counts as a harm, what kinds of actions are possible, what a library is and what counts as value.

Political reasoning and strategic representation: What makes political reasoning different from political metaphor? Political reasoning is always conducted as part of a struggle to control which images of the world's governed policy. Three elements make metaphor reasoning in politics different from pure poetic metaphor. First, the stakes are higher. Political reasoning frames issues for decisions in politics. Second, because it occurs as part of a contest over policy, political reasoning is always addressed to a hostile audience. Third, political reasoning is strategic. It is designed to build constituencies, to break up old alliances and forge new ones, and to galvanize people into action, or to maintain old power structures. It seeks to evoke values and emotions by presenting something as good or evil, innocent or guilty, responsible or not, right or wrong, etc. Ultimately, political reasoning is a process of creating, changing, and defending boundaries.

Policy paradoxes as boundary tensions: boundaries are inherently unstable. In policy politics, boundaries evoke intense passions because the classifications confer advantages and disadvantages - rewards and penalties, permissions and restrictions, or power and powerlessness. Policy boundaries are drawn and re-drawn as noted through persuasion, the concept of rights, the definition of authority, decision making, rules, and inducement systems.

The value of political reason: equity, efficiency, liberty, security, democracy, justice and other such goals are only aspirations for a community, into which people read contradictory interpretations. While the interpretations divide people, the aspirations unite us. Political reasoning may seem to lack constraints, but it still forces us to interact with an audience, persuade others, and to look outside our own will for grounds for action. Boundary tensions may be the curse of our existence as thinking and communal beings. The political reason is our privilege. It allows us to conduct our border wars with imagination.